This study provides an empirical analysis of several intraday liquidity dynamics for stocks listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) using transaction data for the period from 1/1/2005 to 31/8/2005. We used a cross-market index, which is composed of 37 stocks, to estimate different liquidity proxies. Then these liquidity proxies are represented graphically to check for intraday commonalities. The analysis demonstrates that volume measures; bid-ask spread, instant trades and number of large trades exhibit a U-shape, liquidity ratio has a smooth L-shape, while waiting time to trade exhibits an inverse U-shape, the same results are observed for the case of an individual stock. The results reveals that ASE highest activity levels are at market open and close, whereas it is least active between 11:20 and 11:35 am, suggesting a possible high information asymmetry level at opens and intensive large traders' activities at close.
Introduction
This study uses minute by minute transaction data on 37 companies listed in ASE over the period 1/1/2005 to 31/8/2005 (165 trading days) to test the statistical patterns between different cross-market liquidity proxies. Liquidity is measured via transactions; that is ex-post, after periodically regrouping transaction data through several measures representing the four liquidity dimensions identified by Kyle (1985) and Harris (1990) ; immediacy, tightness, depth, and resiliency. The same analysis is carried out considering the case of an individual stock with further investigation of market concentration.
More specifically our study tries to answer the following questions:
2 How do different market-wide intraday liquidity measures behave during the day?
3 How are the different liquidity measures related to each other?
4 Does an intraday pattern for market concentration exist? Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) is considered to be one of the most important exchanges in the Meddle East, which currently took different measures to improve its microstructure considering international standard and experiences of major stock exchanges. First, The ASE underwent a structural break lately that likely affected liquidity, namely equity market liberalization. These liberalizations give foreign investors the opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities up to 100% in some sectors. Second, like many emerging markets, ASE has automated its trading system in order to attract order flows and increase liquidity through improved market transparency and enhance quality of execution. In March 26, 2000, the Jordanian stock market computerized its trading system and eliminated the traditional trading floor on which brokers exchanged securities. Third, the market has witnessed an increase in the number of listed companies through out the years, which gives an indication of the economic growth in Jordan. Market capitalization also increased since the establishment of the ASE market. At the end of 2004, 192 companies were listed on the market with a total market capitalization of JDs 13033.8 million. Even with all this development, ASE, like any emerging exchange, is still characterized by low turnover ratio, low liquidity, low transparency, and high volatility as compared to the developed markets.
Frictions in ASE, including the existence of trading and transaction costs, short sales restrictions, the existence of price limit, and illiquidity is expected to impact price formation. The two main restrictions of 5% daily price limits imposed on stock prices, along with the restriction on short selling, used to dampen volatility that affect small investors, might have major implication on stock prices. The impact of these restrictions, on liquidity, volatility and consequently return have recently attracted attention from policy makers, investors and academics in the emerging stock market of Jordan.
The contribution of this paper is twofold; first, this paper looks at the effect of different institutional characteristics on liquidity and the behavior of investors in a small market, ASE. Characterizing the behavior of trading and liquidity components can help traders, national and foreign, in this market build their trading strategies and take their positions accordingly. Second, we use different liquidity measures. This can help exchange officials and regulators better interpret and monitor the market fluctuations based on these different measurs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 outlines the Institutional characteristics of ASE. Section 4 describes our data and methodology. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. Madhavan (2000 Madhavan ( ) & (2002 Stoll (2003), and Freyre-Sanders et al (2004) surveyed the literature on the market microstructure; their papers provide useful comprehensive reviews of theoretical, empirical, and experimental available related studies. The behavior of prices depends on the trading mechanisms' ability to match the buying and selling desires of market participants, which involves the provision of liquidity (O'Hara, 2003) .
Literature review
One strand of literature related to the theoretical and the empirical work tries to determine the trading costs and the process by which information is ultimately translated into realized prices and volumes (i.e. spread formation). Prominent studies in this group focus on the role of liquidity provider; the most common factors identified to cause price movements are order processing, inventory control and adverse selection.
The early work of Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972) show that a liquidity provider incurs order processing costs as well as additional risk, by providing intermediation and immediacy services to the rest of market participants, and hence should be compensated for by the bid-ask spread. The role of liquidity providers reduces the risk of not executing the trade, this imposes an additional (order processing) cost friction which is therefore expected to be higher for illiquid, thinly traded securities.
The study found that trading activity measures have a significant negative impact on spread. Demsetz (1968) results motivated further research regarding spread measures and determinants of trading costs.
A second factor contributing to bid-ask spread is inventory control costs (eg. Garman (1976) , Stoll (1978) , Amihud & Mendelson (1980) , Ho & Stoll (1981) ). In these papers, the liquidity provider has an optimal inventory position that he prefers to hold based on the degree of his risk aversion; trades force him away from his initial position, therefore he changes spread to restore the initial position; spread becomes wider (narrower) when a liquidity provider is away from (bellow) his position .
Recent work suggests models of the impact of information on market prices. Copeland & Galai (1983) , Glosten & Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) , Glosten (1987) , Easly & O'Hara (1987) Admati & Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that bid-ask spread exists even if both order processing and inventory costs have a zero value due to information based trading.
Liquidity provider deals with both informed and uninformed traders; an informed trader possesses private information that allows him better estimate an asset's true value, therefore makes profit on the expense of liquidity provider. Uninformed trader doesn't posses private information but transacts for different reasons not necessarily related to fundamentals. Informed traders will buy (sell) only if price is below (above) what they assume as true value, otherwise they stop trading. A liquidity provider will loose to this type of traders, but his losses are offset by the gains from uninformed traders, and since a market maker can not necessarily distinguish between informed and uninformed traders, he would charge the spread to everyone in order to break even.
Although a liquidity provider can not determine with certainty the true value of the security, he can learn from the sequence of trades (Glosten & Milgrom (1985) , Glosten (1987) , Easly & O'Hara (1987) ). Sequential buy (sell) orders makes him revise his beliefs for the probability that the true value is higher (lower), and therefore widen (narrow) the spread. No trade provides information as well according to Easly & O'Hara (1992) ; it is perceived as no new private information exists therefore it's unlikely to trade against an informed trader. Therefore, an adverse selection cost is imposed as a result of information asymmetry. Hasbrouck (1991) notes that the asymmetric information price impact is positive and has a concave function of the trade size and that information asymmetries are more significant for smaller firms.
To protect themselves from imposed adverse selection costs; informed traders might strategically hide behind activity of uninformed traders by either spreading their trades or by distributing them over time before information become common knowledge (Kyle, 1985) , or trading when volume is high (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988) . This strategic tendency of market participants result in an intraday patterns of trading volumes, where higher trading volumes at certain periods are associated with higher adverse selection cost as probability of existing informed traders increase.
Uninformed traders can reduce their adverse selection costs by trading in a basket of securities ( i.e. stock indices) rather than in an individual stock (it is unlikely for a market wide information to exist). The impact of information asymmetry is minimized as the number of stocks in the basket increases (Subrahmanyam, 1991) . Stoll (1989) tested the hypothesis of combined effect, results show that order processing, inventory control, and adverse selection costs are constant in percentage and are equal to 47%, 10%, and 43% respectively. Lin et al (1995) shows that trading volume; relative spreads, and information costs decrease over the day for all trade size categories but the largest 1 percentage. The order processing cost tends to be highest during the middle of the day, while the persistence of trade arrivals is highest at the end of the day.
Theory suggests that at the beginning of the trading day, information asymmetry, and hence adverse selection cost is high (accordingly volatility and bid ask spreads are high too). Due to learning from trading activities and price discovery; information asymmetry decrease (adverse selection cost decrease) but at the end of the trading day the risk of carrying inventory overnight for a market maker increases, causing spreads to widen again (inventory control cost increase). Cushing & Madhavan (2001) provide empirical evidence that higher trading costs toward market close are due to increased institutional trading activities at closing. This behavior result in a "U" shape of trading volume, volatility and average bid-ask spread over the trading day.
Literature on Emerging markets using microstructure data is still rare. Emerging markets are classified as being volatile, but with significant returns which in turn should be balanced with liquidity concerns of those markets (Lesmond, 2005) . Ghysels & Cherkaoui (1999) examine models of effective spreads as well as price impact of large block trades in emerging markets, to test whether the trading costs have significantly changed since the stock market microstructure reforms. They conclude that none of the models used were adequate or appropriate for the conditions of emerging markets. Despite the shortcomings of the models tested, they show that spreads tended to increase rather than decrease. However, the increase in spreads is not purely a reflection of increased overall volatility in the market. The price impact of large block trades, if any, also increased. A year following its establishment, the ASE initiated a modernization, upgrading and automation program for its trading environment. The ASE made a successful transition from the manual system to an electronic trading system (ETS). The ASE operates the French Electronic Trading System NSC-Unix hardware.
Institutional Characteristics of ASE

B. The Trading Process in ASE
The trading day for stock exchange market consists of four main phases; pre-opening, opening, continuous trading, and closing. At the pre-opening phase (9:30-10:00 am); orders are submitted through the brokers to the system which are then automatically recorded and ranked via its priorities on the central order book, but not executed.
Orders are ranked first according to price priorities (descending for buy orders, and ascending for sell orders), then by time priorities (first in first out), then by size (if orders with same price are entered simultaneously larger orders are given priority).
At this stage a broker has the right to cancel or modify his beforehand entered orders. According to the validity on the book; orders are either valid for a day, a limited date, good till canceled, and execute and eliminate the remaining quantity if only partially filled. The ASE also allows hidden orders, a broker has the right to define a minimum quantity visible in the order book and hide the remaining. This option helps minimizing the price impact cost of large trades.
All stocks listed in ASE are traded and priced in a continuous fashion; however, a stock may appear occasionally in a status other than traded; a stock is suspended when there is going to be a corporate action or a financial operation affecting the value of a firm's stock or upon request from relevant authorities, and frozen if any entered order is automatically stopped by the electronic trading system because it provokes trades at price outside the authorized variation margin. The stock is reserved at the trading start if the IEP was estimated bellow or above the authorized limits or when an open price order at one side of the book and no trades at the opposite side exist. 
Data and Methodology
Data Filtering
For each day and for each individual stock; 1) transactions executed at the same point in time and the same price is aggregated into one trade, 2) transactions executed at first minute after openings are eliminated. And finally; 3) the two hours trading sessions (10:00 -12:00 am) are divided into twenty-four 5-minutes intervals.
Instant trades that are executed at the same price are assumed to be originally initiated as one trade (probably one order at one side of the book being executed against more than one order on the opposite side of the book), for this reason they are Where NT t is the number of trades between time t-1 and t, TS i is the number of shares in trade i, P i is the price of trade i, and t i refers to the particular transaction i.
Although volume measures are the most common liquidity proxy used in stock exchanges and in literature describing interday and intradaily patterns; it fails to sufficiently reflect market impact of price movements and variant sizes of different trades, because it considers small and large size trades as having the same effect (Ranaldo, 2000) . Other studies claim that information contained in trading frequency is higher than in trade size or number of trades (Ekinci, 2004) . Therefore, some other liquidity proxies are employed in order to capture the different liquidity dimensions.
The immediacy dimension is measured by the number of instant trades (NI); that is trades taking place subsequently within a very short time (i.e. within seconds):
Where, it D is the time duration in seconds between transactions i+1 and i. Ekinci (2004) defines instant trades to be those occurring subsequently within two seconds.
In the current study however, time duration considered in order to estimate this measure is 10 seconds because stocks listed in ASE are generally described as thinly traded. Market tightness refers to the cost of immediacy, and is widely measured by the different bid-ask spread estimators. One common limitation faces the estimation of market tightness is the unavailability of data regarding quoted prices. To overcome this shortfall, we will define estimators for bid-ask spread that depends on data of transacted orders (i.e. executed prices) which is usually available. In this study, the popular Roll (1984) Spread estimator is employed in order to establish a proxy for implied trading costs; despite the critiques of many researches providing evidence that Roll's spread explains only order processing cost and fails to contain other costs such as the market maker's inventory control cost and information asymmetry cost, and hence the measured spread is underestimated. Being faced with the same limitation in the ASE, spread is measured by the Roll estimator. The underestimation of the measure, however, is expected to be less influential in the case of stocks listed in the ASE because there are no market makers, and hence inventory control costs do not exist. The Roll Spread (RS) is:
Where ∆ p t , ∆ p t-1 are price changes at time t, t-1 respectively, S is one-half bid-ask spread.
Another measure that proxy for liquidity is the number of big trades (BT) within a defined time period. Easly and O'Hara (1987) argue that big trades signal the identity of the trader such that institutional traders usually initiate large trades.
Therefore, the trade size that exceeds 3000 shares is considered a big one.
The final liquidity proxy used is the liquidity ratio (LR) which is related to resiliency dimension. The liquidity ratio employed in this study is LR(3) which relates the sum of absolute returns to the number of trades, therefore measures the average price change of a trade. Accordingly; a high average price change of a trade indicates low liquidity. 
Analysis A. Descriptive Statistics
In order to measure intraday liquidity on the ASE and to characterize the behavior of the different established measures, the transaction data for 37 stocks are used. The sectoral presentation is not taken into consideration, nevertheless; it is worthwhile to mention that the sample does not include any insurance company since this sector in the ASE consists generally of small-cap companies that are thinly traded and the daily traded volume on this sector accounts for not more than 1%, on average, of the daily total market volume. The sample stocks consist of 11 banks, 18 service companies, and 8 industrial companies.
Total number of transactions for the sample is 1,001,944 before filtering, and 576,168 after filtering. The filtering procedures decreased the number of transactions by a quite large percentage (42.5%). This highlights the significance of the opening trades which is a preliminary indication that liquidity is significantly high at the opening, and/or the number of re-grouped trades is high meaning that a significant number of initiated orders are matched each with a number of smaller trades on the opposite side of the book, which is a preliminary indication of illiquidity.
Each of the measures RS, NT, TO, TS, BT, IT, LR, and WT in equations (1) to (8) shows a positive excess kurtosis. Moreover; all measures, except of WT, are skewed to the right indicating that none of the estimated measures is normally distributed. B. Intraday Liquidity Patterns Table 3 exhibits the Pearson correlations between the eight different liquidity measures estimated for the cross-market index composed of the 37 stocks. As it can be expected; waiting time between subsequent trades WT is negatively correlated with all other measures. Bid-ask spread RS is highly correlated with the number of big trades BT, which signals the price impact of large trades. The price impact of large trades can be inferred as well from the high correlation between RS and liquidity ratio LR, and between BT trades and LR, since liquidity ratio relates the average price change to the number of trades NT. This is why LR is negatively related to NT. Actually, volume measures (TS, TO, and NT) are interlinked together, and it is expected that they exhibit high correlation with each other. The same case is true when considering the correlation between NT and the number of instant trades IT. .012
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. It is obvious from the first sight at figures 1 to 5 bellow which plot the 24 intraday intervals' estimates of each liquidity proxy for the composed index, that RS, NT, TO, TS, BT, and IT exhibit the popular "U" shape observed by many researchers' work in this field, while LR can be better described as a smooth "L" shape, and WT as an inverse "U" shape. The findings in this section are consistent with other studies investigating patterns in intraday activity (e.g. Admati & Pfleiderer (1988) ). The ASE trading activity exhibits intraday commonality. The study on the Swiss market by Ranaldo (2000) however, characterizes the pattern of trading volume as having a triple U-shape.
Ekinci (2004) observes a W-shape; an inverse J-curve at the morning session and a U-curve at the afternoon session in the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
The number of large trades accompanied with higher implicit trading costs in term of bid-ask spread, along with the overall high activity level at the opening; indicates that information asymmetry is highest at the opening. Liquidity ratio as is measured in the current study estimates the average price change per trade, therefore discloses the higher price volatility at the opening. As Easly & O'Hara (1992) suggest; large trades are informed trades, in addition; the same authors, in their paper (1987) suggest that sequential trades along with the high trade volume, causes spread to widen since they signal information asymmetry. Trading volume is high when informed traders exist as they choose strategically to hide their activity in periods when liquidity traders dominate the market ( (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988) and (Kyle, 1985) ).
Learning from sequential trades, especially when the trade size is large; causes spread to narrow and the time between subsequent trades to increase toward the middle time of the trading session as suggested by Easly and O'Hara (1987) . As both, timing and quantities of trades, are directly observable to all market participants in the ASE this study agrees with the explanation suggested by those studies in explaining the behavior of trading activity at the open and the middle of the trading session. However, the increase in spread and the overall trading activity just before the market close can not be explained by the high inventory holding costs as in Garman (1976 ), Stoll (1978 , Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981) , since no market makers exist in the ASE. Taking into consideration the higher number of large and instant trades toward the market close along with the higher trading costs, however can be explained by increased institutional and large traders' activities at the close which is an indication of speculative behavior by those From our analysis on UAIC company, we found the same patterns observed in the composed cross-market index hold for all liquidity proxies of UAIC company (figures are not shown here to preserve space). The highest observed activity level for the UAIC is at the market open and toward the market close, whereas, the lowest liquidity level is observed between 11.25 and 11.40 am.
B. Intraday Market Concentration
Market liquidity does not depend only on volume and depth measures, but also on the distribution of volume expected to arrive in the future, (Ranaldo, 2000) . The "GINI Index" represents a general proxy of size volume concentration for each period of 10 minutes for a sample period of two months' trading data of a highlyactive stock in order to estimate the extent to which a trading period is characterized by a small number of large trades or by trades with a homogenous size.
Where X h is the cumulated number of ordered trade variable, for h = 0,...,n, with X 0 = 0, X n = 1, Y h is the cumulated trade size, for h = 0,...,n, with Y 0 = 0, Y n = 1. The individual stock UAIC, which is classified as the most liquid stock among the sample of 37 stocks, is used for the empirical analysis of the GINI index. The intraday periods used for the analysis are the 5 minutes intervals previously described with the same data filtering procedures and for the same period 
The cumulated trade size at the end of interval t is:
The ratio of cumulated trade size (Y t,i ) at the end of interval t is: 
Summary and Conclusions
The study investigates the cross-market intraday behavior of liquidity in Amman Stock Exchange using high frequency data that is tick-by-tick transaction data for the 
